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INDEX NO. 2019-52579
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 29

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/01/2019

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
Present:
Hon. Maria G. Rosa, Justice
GEORGE PHILLIPS,
Petitioner,

DECISION, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT
Index No. 52579119

-againstTINA M. STANFORD, CHAIR OF THE NEW YORK
STATEi PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.

The following papers were read on this Article 78 petition:
NOTICE OF PETITION
PETITION
EXHIBITS A - F
ANSWfR AND RETURN
EXHIBITS 1 -1 3
REPLY AFFIRMATION
This is an Article 78 proceeding in which Petitioner challenges a determination denying him
discretionary parole release. In January 2000 Petitioner was sentenced after trial in Queens County
to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years incarceration after being convicted of two counts of Rape in
the First Degree, one count of Sodomy and three counts of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree.
Petition,er then entered an Alford plea (without admission of guilt) in Nassau County to charges of
Rape in the First Degree, Sodomy inthe First Degree and Attempted Sodomyin the First Degree
resulting in an aggregate sentence of 10 to 2Wyears to run concurrently with the Queens County
sentences. Petitioner was accused of cruising for teenage victims on the Nassau and Queens border,
· forcing them into his vehicle by displayinga weapon and/ot making verbalthreats and then driving
The challenged
· to . mor~ secluded areas where rapes, sodomy and sexual abuses occurred.
the parole
before
appearance
second
Petitioner's
at
2018
9,
October
on
niade
was
determination
board. As of that date he was 54 )'ears old and had served 22 years in prison.
"
to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c), the New York State Board ofParo1e is required to
Pursuant
consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole.
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See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2nd Dept. 2010). The parole board must
also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he willli ve
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for
the law." 9 NYCRR 8002.1. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v.
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2"d Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 AD3d I 099, 1100 (3'd Dept.
201 0). However, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole board may not deny release
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 947; King v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1 st Dept. 1993). Moreover, while the board need
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). finally, the board
must inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for denial of parole and "[s]uchreasons
shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms. " Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v. Evans,
83 AD 3d 719 (2"d Dept. 20 I l ). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd.
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980).
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the
board in taking this approach when making paro le determinations, the amendment required the
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's
rehabifitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramirez v. Evans, 118 AD 3d 707 (2"d
Dept. 20 14). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS (Conectional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A COMPAS assessment was
prepared in connection with Petitioner's October 9, 2018 appearance before the Parole Board.
Petitioner claims that the Parole Board's decision was improperly based solely on the
seriousness of his offenses, failed to adequately detail the reasons for the denial of the parole, failed
to provide a justification for departing from reliance upon his low COMPAS scores and denied him
his due process rights. Petitioner submitted a parole packet prior to the hearing that included
evidence of successful completion of numerous programs including Aggression Replacement
Training ("ART"), the Large Print Vocational Education program, Transitional Services I and II,
Legal Research and several religious programs. He further submitted numerous letters of support
from attorneys currently representing him in connection with his claims of innocence, family
members and friends. He also produced letters extend ing him employment offers upon release. His
COMP AS risk assessment instrument found him a low risk in all categories and stated he had a high
school diploma, a skill or trade, family support and specific employment plans with no history of
substance abuse.
2
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Petitioner's parole hearing began with a significant discussion pertaining to his claims of
innocence. He initially requested an adjournment of the hearing based upon an alleged pending
application. The Parole Board properly recognized that it was required to presume Petitioner was
guilty of the offenses for which he was convicted. The Board then recounted the factual allegations
underlying Petitioner's crimes and made an inquiry as to how he could have been convicted in light
of his adamant claims of innocence. A discussion then ensued about Petitioner's failure to
participate in a sex offender treatment program. Petitioner indicated that while he could sign up for
the program, he bel ieved that maintaining his innocence would result in his discharge. The Board
then made inquiry into his release plans. Petitioner stated that he intended to reside with his elderly
parents and had offers of employment in the medical diagnostic field doing administrative work with
an alternative plan to work for a financial consultant. Petitioner noted that he had a bachelor's
degree in economics and business that he obtained prior to his incarceration, stating that he had
owned a commercial real estate company for fifteen years. Petitioner asserted that he would not
need any financial support upon release. The Board acknowledged Petitioner's low COMPAS scores
but disagreed with the low score for history of violence based on the violent nature of his crimes.
It acknowledged his program accomplishments, lack of any significant disciplinary record and work
history while incarcerated. The Board noted that his behavior while incarcerated was commendable
while simultaneously stating that it was required to consider the serious nature of his crimes of
conviction. It further acknowledged receiving responses from the sentencing j udge and the district
attorney's office.
Fallowing the hearing the Parole Board issued a short decision denying parole. The decision
stated that if Petitioner were released, there was a reasonable probability he would not live and
remain at liberty without violating the law and that "release would be incompatible with the welfare
and safety of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect
for the law." The decision stated that the Board considered the required statutory factors along with
Petitioner's institutional adjustment including discipline, program participation, risk and needs
assessment and his needs for successful re-entry into the community. The Board st ated, however,
that more compelling was the serious nature of the rape, sodomy and sexual assault charges for
which he was convicted. It further cited a prior conviction for public lewdness, stating that the
instant offenses represented a serious escalation of violent and criminal behaviors. It noted his
Stating that the panel weighed and
positive programming and limited disciplinary record.
low scores indicated therein, it found
and
considered the results of his risks and needs assessment
that the "serious and lifelong pain and suffering [petitioner caused) his many female victims"
outweighed these factors. The decision recounted that these victims were abducted, forced into a
vehicle, threatened with a weapon or physical harm and then sexually assaulted. Based on the
foregoing, the Board determined discretionary release was not warranted.
This court's role is not to usurp the decision making authority statutorily vested in the Board
of Parole. It only has the authority to determine whether the Board considered the relevant statutory
factors in making its final determination. See Matter of Russo, supra. In conducting such review,
the court considers the parole interview and entire record before it but ultimately must assess
whether the parole board's decision is arbitrary or affected by an error of law. Here, the sole facts
3
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set forth in the Board's written's decision supporting parole denial are a recitation of Petitioner's
crimes of conviction, the violent nature of such crimes, the impacts they had on the victims and an
assertion that the instant offenses represent an escalation ofviolent and criminal behavior based upon
prior convictions for disorderly conduct and public lewdness. These facts and the Board's assertion
that the violent nature of Petitioner's offenses warranted a higher score for "history of violence" on
his COMP AS assessment are all directly or indirectly related to his crimes of conviction. A Parole
Board is permitted to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of the offenses committed, but may not
deny parole based solely on the seriousness of such offenses. See Ferrante v. Stanford, 172 AD2d
While the Board
31 (2"d Dept 2019); Rossakis v. NYS Bd of Parole, 146 AD3d 22 (2016).
safety of society
and
welfare
the
with
concluded that Petitioner's release would be incompatible
because he would likely not live and remain at liberty without violating the law, the only facts cited
in support of this conclusion were based on the conduct underlying Petitioner's offenses.
An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason norregard
to the facts. See Matter of Wooley v. NYS Dept. ofCorr. Servs, 15 NY3d 275 (2010). Here, other
than citing facts related to petitioner's offenses, the facts the parole board articulated do not support
its ultimate determination. Petitioner's COMPAS scores, program participation, disciplinary history,
employment history and release plans all support a finding contrary to that made by the parole board.
It is not the function of this court to review the record to determine whether or not it, taken as a
whole, would lend rational support to the Board's final determination. The Board is obligated to
articulate facts underlying its ultimate determination to enable this court to review whether it
rationally applied those facts to the requisite statutory factors. The Board in this case failed to
articulate such facts and thus its decision lacks a rational basis. While there may be factors in the
record supporting its ultimate determination, it is the obligation ofthe Board to state those facts and
its reliance thereon in its decision.

Petitioner also demonstrates tbat the Board failed to comply with 9 NYCRR §8002.2(a).
That rule requires a Parole Board making a release determination to be guided by an inmates's risks
and needs scores as generated by a risk assessment instrument. If the Board's determination to deny
release departs from a risks and needs assessment score, it is required to specify any scale in such
assessment from which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such departure. See 9
NYCRR §8002. The COMPAS assessment prepared in connection with Petitioner's parole
appearance gave him the lowest possible rating in categories for risk of felony violence, re-arrest,
absconding, for criminal involvement and found he was unlikely to have issues with family support
or significant financial problems upon release. The Parole Board finding that discretionary release
would not be compatible with the welfare of society directly contradicts these scores. In accordance
with 9 NYCRR §8002.2, the Board was thus required to articulate with specificity the particular
scales in petitioner's COMPAS assessment from which it was departing and provide an
individualized reason for such departures. The Board's conclusory statement that it considered
statutory factors, including his institutional adjustment, discipline, program participation and needs
for successful re-entry in finding that the discretionary release would not be compatible with the
welfare of society fails to meet this standard. As such, its determination denying parole release was
also affected an error of Jaw. Based on the foregoing, it is
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;

ORDERED that the petition to vac;ate and annul the October 9, 2018 determination denying
parole release as arbitrary and as affected by an error of Jaw is granted to the extent that the Board
of Parole shall conduct a de novo parole release interview within sixty days of the date of this
decision and order. The court rejects Petitioner's claim that the denial of parole was in violation of
his constitutional due process rights. There is no inherent constitutional right to parole and a Parole
Board's discretionary determination to deny parole release does not implicate a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. See Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd. of Parofe, 50 NY2d at 76; Barna v.
Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2nd Cir. 2001). Petitioner's claims of actual innocence have no bearing on this
court's determination as such claims were not relevant to the Court's review of the Parole Board's
challenged determination. Nor did the court consider Petitioner's pro se letter and exhibits
submitted in reply.As Petitioner is represented by counsel who submitted an affirmation in reply,
he is not permitted to submit a second pro se reply.
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the Court

Dated:~~ 1<iS\ 2019
Poughkeepsie, New York
ENTER:

MARIA G. ROSA, J. S.C.
Scanned to theE-File System only
Pursuant to CPLR §5513, an appeal as of right must be taken within thirty days after service by a
party ,upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its
entry, e.xcept that when the appellant has served a copy of the judgmetit or order and written ndtice
of its entry, the appeal must betaken within thirty days thereof.

Kathy Manley, Esq.
26 Dinmore Road
Selkirk, NY 12158
Office of the Attorney General
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, NY 1260 I
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